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ABSTRACT
The application of the Chinese wall security policy model (CWSPM ) to control the informa-
tion flows between two or more competing and/or conflicting companies in cloud computing
(Multi-tenancy) or in the social network, is a very interesting solution.
The main goal of the Chinese Wall Security Policy is to build a wall between the datasets
of competing companies, and among the system subjects. This is done by the applying to
the subjects mandatory rules, in order to control the information flow caused between them.
This problem is one of the hottest topics in the area of cloud computing (as a distributed
system) and has been attempted in the past; however the proposed solutions cannot deal
with the composite information flows problem (e.g., a malicious Trojan horses problem),
caused by the writing access rule imposed to the subject on the objects.
In this article, we propose a new CWSP model, based on the access query type of the subject
to the objects using the concepts of the CWSP. We have two types of walls placement, the
first type consists of walls that are built around the subject, and the second around the
object. We cannot find inside each once wall two competing objects’ data. We showed that
this mechanism is a good alternative to deal with some previous models’ limitations. The
model is easy to implement in a distributed system (as Cloud-Computing). It is based on the
technique of Object Oriented Programming (Can be used in Cloud computing ”Software as
a service SaaS”) or by using the capabilities as an access control in real distributed system.
Keywords: Security Policy, Chinese Wall, Information flow, Distributed system, Cloud
Computing
1. INTRODUCTION
The cloud computing technology comes with
numerous advantages, but also brings with
it some disadvantages or challenges. One of
the challenges of cloud computing is the se-
curity, protection, and trust caused by Multi-
tenancy. For instance, it is possible to find
c© 2016 ADFSL Page 149
JDFSL V11N4 A New Distributed Chinese Wall Security Policy Model
two competitors using the same cloud infras-
tructure and the same provider. This may
cause issues of how to control the informa-
tion flow between those competing compa-
nies and also between subjects in general.
The Chinese Wall Security Policy CWSP is
a very interesting candidate solution to the
above problem. The CWSP has already
been used in commercial applications; for
instance, the UK’s financial sector, which
provides consulting services, uses the CWSP
model. As consultants must respect the con-
fidentiality agreements, the CWSP is used
to prevent such confidentiality from being
breached by avoiding the information flow
that causes conflict of interest between in-
volved parties.
The CWSP was defined and named by
Brewer and Nash (BN model). They have
developed their first model in 1989 (Brewer
& Nash, 1989). The model became very
attractive and therefore many other mod-
els based on the same idea have been pro-
posed in subsequent years (Lin, 1989, 2000,
2002, 2003, 2007, 2015; Sharifi & Tripuni-
tara, 2013). The model and its variant have
been successfully used in many applications
(Atluri, Chun, & Mazzoleni, 2004; Minsky,
2004; Hsiao & Hwang, 2010; Wu, Ahn, Hu,
& Singhal, 2010; Tsai, Chen, Huang, Huang,
& Chou, 2011; Kesarwani et al., 2011; Xie,
Ray, Adaikkalavan, & Gamble, 2013) in or-
der to control the information flow between
the competing subjects residing in the same
system. More importantly, after an exten-
sive state-of-the-art on the proposed secu-
rity models based on Chinese wall, we find
that the main goal of those models is to con-
trol the composite information flow (CIF )
between competing companies (a malicious
Trojan horse’s problem), caused by the ac-
cesses in writing from the subjects on the
objects. We can summarise these models by
the following two important points:
• ”The basis of the Chinese wall policy
is that people are only allowed access to
information which is not held to conflict
with any other information that they al-
ready possess”(Brewer & Nash, 1989).
So, the user (subject) cannot access any
other information in conflict with the in-
formation already possessed. So, each
subject has a Granted and a Denied set
of companies, where, each company in
Granted set has their competing com-
panies in the Denied set. The pairwise
(Granted, Denied), interpreted by the
build of the wall around the subject,
named ”subject’s wall.” And we con-
clude that, ”we cannot find inside the
same wall two competing objects’ data.”
• ”Information can flow between two ob-
jects only via a subject, and informa-
tion can flow between two subjects only
via an object” (Sharifi & Tripunitara,
2013), (malicious Trojan horse’s prob-
lem). So, from these points in our hand,
we can apply by symmetry the build of
the wall around the object as a same
rule to the subject (we cannot find in the
same wall two competing objects’ data)
. So, we have the second wall around
the object, named ”object’s wall.”
However, the object is a passive entity,
and is an opposite to the subject, considered
it as an ”active entity,” has an ”access right”
Granted / Denied. The object is used to
store the data, so each object has a ”Stored
right” (is not like the access right), where
we cannot store inside the same object, data
related to two competing companies. So,
the object has two sets Allied and Conflict,
where the Allied set has the companies (ob-
jects) who have a data stored inside the same
object (so in allied), and the Conflict set
contains the companies (objects) in conflict
with the Allied set. The pairwise (Conflict,
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Allied) can be interpreted by the build of
the wall around the object, named ”object’s
wall.”
In our approach, each subject has a
security label composed by the pairwise
(Granted, Denied), each object has a secu-
rity label composed by the pairwise (Con-
flict, Allied) and the rule to execute the read-
ing or writing query is ”we cannot find two
competing data inside the same wall (object’s
or subject’s wall).” From this idea, we can
build walls between the competing compa-
nies, and so the concept of the policy of Chi-
nese wall (Brewer & Nash, 1989). The model
assures an efficient control of the direct and
composite information flow.
At this level and to apply our model of
the policy of CWSP in distributed system,
the securities labels for the subject or object,
can manage they, by the server that host
the subject/object. So, each access query
of any subject to any object will associate it
with the security label of the subject, where
it is verify by the server that host the ob-
ject. So, our model can be viewed as a dis-
tributed CWSP model (D-CWSPM). And,
also can be implemented based on a tech-
nique of Object Oriented Programming (Can
be used in Cloud computing ”Software as a
service SaaS”) or by using the capabilities as
an access control in real distributed system.
The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows: In section 2, we will present our
idea illustrated by an example. In section
3, we will present the formal model and in-
formation flow problems. In section 4, we
will present the D-CWSPM vs Access Matrix
(can be used in system based on matrix as an
access control). In section 5, we present the
related previous works. In section 6, we will
present the implementation of D-CWSPM
based on OOP. Then we will provide a con-
clusion with the future research directions,
then in the appendix, the two main models
(BN’s and Lin’s model) and the related of
the binary relation, equivalence relation and
the partitions. And finally, a list of refer-
ences used in our work.
2. MODELS IDEA
ANALYSIS
In this work, we based our idea on the access
query type of the subject to the objects and
the philosophy of the Chinese wall security
policy CWSP. Its rule is the building of the
walls between the competing companies. In
our model, we have two types of walls place-
ment, the first is built around the subject,
and the second around the object. We can-
not find inside the same wall two data re-
lated to two competing objects. So, we start
by these analysis:
The subject firstly, is freely to choose to
access to any object; at this step it’s im-
portant to known the nature of this access:
reading or writing access, as in following:
2.1 Reading Queries:
If the access is a reading request, or the sub-
ject reads from the object, so we can inter-
pret this by the moving of the data from the
object side into the subject side (inside the
subject’s wall). Therefore, there is a related
data (information) of the object inside this
wall. Consequently, the access is denied of
this subject to the competing objects with
the objects inside subject’s wall. Therefore,
the subject has two security labels:
• The Subject Wall Granted (SWG): Is
a set of objects, who theirs related data
are in the subject’s side.
• Subject Wall Denied (SWD): The set
of all objects denied to moving theirs
data into the subject’s side.
The pairwise (SWG,SWD), can be inter-
preted, by the building of the wall around
the subject.
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2.2 Writing Queries:
If the access is writing query by the subject
Subi into the object Obj, we can interpret
this type of query by moving of objects re-
lated information from the Subi’s wall into
the object Obj. So, the second wall is built
around the object, and this object’s wall can-
not contains any competing object’s data.
Therefore, the object’s wall has two security
labels:
• The object’s wall in Allied (OWA): A
set of objects, where their related data
stored inside Obj. So, they are allied
with the object Obj.
• Object’s wall in Conflict (OWC): A set
of objects in conflict of interest with the
objects, who have related data stored
inside the object Obj, so they denied to
moving them into the Obj’s side.
The pairwise (OWA,OWC), can be inter-
preted, by the building of the wall around
the object Obj.
2.3 Illustration by an
example:
If we have two subjects Sub1 and Sub2, and
five objects Ob1, Ob2, Ob3, Ob4 and Ob5,
where Ob1 in competition with Ob2, Ob3 in
competition with Ob4 but Ob5 neuter with
the others objects (Table 1).
Table 1. The Initial State of the Object’s
Walls
Object Object’s Wall
Ob1 OWA = {Ob1}; OWC = {Ob2}
Ob2 OWA = {Ob2}; OWC = {Ob1}
Ob3 OWA = {Ob3}; OWC = {Ob4}
Ob4 OWA = {Ob4}; OWC = {Ob3}
Ob5 OWA = {Ob5}; OWC = {∅}
And we have the following sequence
queries in our system:
Q1: Subject Sub1 reading access from the
object Ob1, so moving of data stored in-
side (or related to) of Ob1 to the subject
side Sub1. So we update the Sub1’s wall
as following:
SWG1 = {Ob1} and SWD1 = {Ob2},
Because the object Ob1 in conflict with
the object Ob2. And the subject’s
wall composed by the two pairwise
(SWG1, SWD1)
Q2: Subject Sub1 reading access from the
object Ob2, this access is denied, be-
cause there is inside of its wall a data
related to the object Ob1, where it is in
competition with the object Ob2 (Rules
of Chinese wall security policy (Brewer
& Nash, 1989)).
Q3: Subject Sub2 reading access from the
object Ob2, so the moving of the data
stored inside (or related to) the object
Ob2. So we update the Sub2’s wall as
following:
SWG2 = {Ob2} and SWD2 = {Ob1},
Because the object Ob2 in conflict with
the object Ob1. And the subject
wall composed by the two pairwise
(SWG2, SWD2)
Q4: Subject Sub1 reading access from the
object Ob3, we have inside the Sub1’s
wall a data related to the object Ob1
and this object isn’t in conflict of inter-
est with the object Ob3, so the access is
granted and also the moving of the data
from Ob3 to the subject Sub1 side, inside
of its wall. In the same time the access
denied to the object ob4, in conflict with
Ob3. So we update of the Sub1’s wall as
following:
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SWG1 = {Ob1, Ob3} and
SWD1 = {Ob2, Ob4}.
Q5: Subject Sub1 writing access to the ob-
ject Ob5, so the moving data from the
Sub1 side into the object Ob5. It’s clear,
this data related to Ob1 or Ob3. So prob-
ably, the object Ob5 contains a data re-
lated to the objects Ob1 or Ob3, and can-
not contains a two data related to two
competing objects (Ob2 in conflict with
the object Ob1 and Ob3 with the object
Ob4). So we need to update the Ob5’s
wall as follow:
OWA5 = {Ob5, Ob1, Ob3},
OWC5 = {Ob2, Ob4}.
The Ob5’s wall composed by the pair-
wise (OWA5, SWC5).
Q6: Subject Sub2 writing access to the ob-
ject Ob5, so moving data from its in-
side (a data related to Ob2) into the
object Ob5. However, the object Ob5
contains a data related to the object
Ob1 who it is in competition with Ob2
(Ob2 ∈ OWC5). And, this is in contra-
diction with the Chinese wall security
policy, so this query is denied and not
permitted.
Let now, if we have a third subject Sub3,
where it need to read a data from the object
Ob5 and then write it to the Ob2. So, the
problem is that our malicious subject (Sub3)
need to create a CIF between competing ob-
ject Ob1 and Ob2!
Firstly, the subject Sub3, read data from
the object Ob5. The object Ob5, contains
a data related to two objects Ob1 and Ob3
(from Q5 ) and also the object has two sets
information the OWA5 and the OWC5. So,
we have the two following steps:
1. The first step is the reading: After the
reading access, we have inside Sub3’s
wall a data related to three objects Ob1,
Ob3 and Ob5. So, the updating of the
subject’s wall as following:
SWG3 = SWG3 ∪OWA5,
SWD3 = SWD3 ∪OWC5
So, OWC5 set contains Ob2.
2. The second step is the writing: the writ-
ing access to the object Ob2, this, is not
permitted, because the object is in the
Denied set (SWD3) of the subject. So,
the access is denied.
So, as a result, our malicious subject can-
not create a CIF between competing objects.
And in end we can view in table 2 and 3,
the final state of the Subjects’ and Objects’
walls.
Table 2. The End State of the Subject’s
Walls
Subject Subject’s Walls
Sub1 SWG1 = {Ob1, Ob3};
SWD1 = {Ob2, Ob4}
Sub2 SWG2 = {Ob2}; SWD2 = {Ob1}
Sub3 SWG3 = {Ob1, Ob3, Ob5};
SWD3 = {Ob2, Ob4}
2.4 Queries’ running
conditions:
Let the subject Subi has two sets’ object:
the granted set SWGi and the denied set
SWDi, and the object Obj has two object’s
set: OWAj and OWCj
After, the prior interpretation of the query
access type (Reading / Writing), we can in-
duce the mandatory condition to run the
query of the access of the subject Subi to
the object Obj is:
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Table 3. The end state of the object’s walls
Object Object’s Walls
Ob1 OWA = {Ob1}; OWC = {Ob2}
Ob2 OWA = {Ob2}; OWC = {Ob1}
Ob3 OWA = {Ob3}; OWC = {Ob4}
Ob4 OWA = {Ob4}; OWC = {Ob3}
Ob5 OWA = {Ob1, Ob3, Ob5};
OWC = {Ob2, Ob4}
”we cannot find inside the same
wall, data related to two competing
objects”
.
Formally as in the following:
SWGi ∩OWCj = ∅ and
SWDi ∩OWAj = ∅
3. DISTRIBUTED
CWSP MODEL:
After, the prior illustration, we can now
present the formal model.
Let:
• OB = {obj1, ...objn}, denote the set of
all objects,
• SU = {s1, ..., sm}, denote the set of all
subjects,
• Comp(obji) or simply Compi be the
company dataset of object obji.
3.1 Dataset organization
In our model we keep the dataset organiza-
tion proposed by Lin (Lin, 1989)-(Lin, 2007),
where:
• Lowest Level: we consider individual
items of information, each concerning a
single corporation. We will refer to the
files in which such information is stored
as objects (Brewer & Nash, 1989).
• Intermediate level: we group all ob-
jects which concern the same corpora-
tion together into what we call a com-
pany dataset (Brewer & Nash, 1989).
• Highest level: we associate with each
company dataset, say X, a ”Frechet
neighborhood”, denoted by CIN(X)
”Conflict of Interest Neighborhood of
X”, where CIN(X) is the set of all com-
pany datasets that are in conflict of in-
terest with X.
3.2 Conflict of interest
relation CIR
Let CIR ⊆ OB × OB as a binary relation,
satisfies the following properties.
• CIR-1: CIR is symmetric.
• CIR-2: CIR is anti-reflexive.
It should be clear CIR-2 is necessary, a
company cannot conflict to itself. If com-
pany A is in conflicts with B, B is certainly
in conflicts with A, so CIR-1 is valid.
3.3 Model
Our model is 3 tuple (SU,OB,Query)
where:
3.3.1 OB
Denote the set of all objects, where each ob-
ject obji has or associated with two subsets
of OB:
• OWA(obji) ⊆ OB, Or simply OWAi,
the set of all objects, where they have
a related data stored inside the object
obji. If there is an object objj ∈ OWAi,
so the object obji contains (or stored in-
side itself ) a data related to the object
objj.
• OWC(obji) ⊆ OB, Or simply OWCi,
the set of all objects denied to be stored
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their related data inside the object obji.
So, if there is an object objj ∈ OWCi,
that, the object obji cannot will con-
tain any related information of the ob-
ject objj. Otherwise, the object obji has
a data related to another object in the
conflict of interest with the object objj.
And they are initially as following:
• OWA(obji) = obji, initialized by its
self,
• OWC(obji) = {objj ∈
OB|(obji, objj) ∈ CIR}
The pairwise (OWAi, OWCi) can it inter-
pret by the building of the wall around the
object obji. So, we cannot find inside the
same wall, two data related to two distinct
competing objects.
3.3.2 SU
Denote the set of all subjects, where each
subject Si has or associated with two subsets
of the object OB:
• SWG(Si) ⊆ OB, Or simply SWGi, the
set of the objects have a related data
inside the subject wall of Si (read by
the subject). So, if there is an object
objj ∈ SWGi, so the subject Si contains
a related data of the object objj.
• SWD(Si) ⊆ OB, Or simply SWDi, the
set of the objects denied to will be read
by the subject Si. So, if there is an
object objj ∈ SWDi, that the subject
Si cannot will contain (or read) any re-
lated data of the object objj.
And they are initially as following:
• SWG(Si) = ∅; initialized by an empty
set, because the subject isn’t yet read
any object;
• SWD(Si) = ∅ initialized by an empty
set, because the subject is free to choose
any object
The pairwise (SWGi, SWDi) can it inter-
pret by the building of the wall around the
subject Si, so, we cannot find inside the same
wall two data related to two distinct compet-
ing objects.
3.3.3 Query(Si, objj,mode)
Any query made by a subject Si to access to
the object objj with the mode equal to:
• read: to read from the object
• write: to write into the object
The access is authorized, if and only if,
this condition is verified:
SWGi ∩OWCj = ∅ And
SWDi ∩OWAj = ∅
And in the same time:
If the mode is Reading Query (Writing
into the subject side, inside the subject’s
wall):
• SWGi = SWGi ∪OWAj
• SWDi = SWDi ∪OWCj
If the mode is Writing Query (In Object
side, inside the wall that round the object):
• OWAj = SWGi ∪OWAj
• OWCj = SWDi ∪OWCj
Otherwise, the access is denied.
4. INFORMATION
FLOW’S AND
D-CWSPM
We give the following definition:
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DIF : A direct information flow between
two companies A and B: denoted by
A→ B, is a sequence of read query data
from a company A by any subject, then
writing query of this data into the other
company B by the same subject.
CIF : A composite information flow from A
to B, is a sequence of DIFs (direct infor-
mation flow) made by many subjects,
which starts from A and end at B:
A = A0 → A1 → ...→ An = B
D-CWSPM’s Theorem: The Dis-
tributed CWSPM assures that no DIF and
no CIF between competing companies.
Proof: Let we have the two following
propositions:
1. (A,B) ∈ CIR ⇒ A ∈ OWCB(B ∈
OWCA) and A /∈ OWAB(B /∈ OWAA)
by symmetry.
2. There exists a CIF from A to B, that
is, a composite direct information flow
of size n:
A = A0 → A1 → ...→ An = B
We will use proof by Recurrence; on the
number of DIFs between companies.
Let n the number of DIFs between these
two companies.
With n = 1:
First, the initial assertion: Since A =
A0 → A1 = B is a DIF, or read data from
object A0 by any Subject Si, then write it
by the same subject to A1 = B:
• Reading by the subject Si from the ob-
ject A0 is granted, if and only if:
SWGi ∩OWCA0 = ∅ And
SWDi ∩OWAA0 = ∅
And the result is:
SWGi = SWGi ∪OWAA0
and
SWDi = SWDi ∪OWCA0
• Writing by the subject to object A1 is
granted, if and only if:
SWGi ∩OWCA1 = ∅ And
SWDi ∩OWAA1 = ∅.
This condition, assures that A0 isn’t in
the conflict of interest with A1. How-
ever, in our case we have, A = A0 in
conflict with A1 = B (A in conflict with
B), so no DIF between A and B if they
are in competing, so the query is denied
QED.
So, if n equal to 1, there isn’t a DIF be-
tween two competing companies.
Otherwise, in the case of A0 isn’t in con-
flict of interest with A1:
OWA1 = OWA1 ∪ SWGi
OWC1 = OWC1 ∪ SWDi.
So the result of the DIF from A0 to A1 is:
OWA0 ⊆ OWA1
OWC0 ⊆ OWC1.
So, A0 ∈ OWA1.
Let now our theorem is true with n−1 DIFs
and we need to verify, if is it true for n DIFs.
So we have:
A = A0 → A1 → ...→ An−1
And we need to extend it to An = B, where
A ∈ OWCB. From the sequence of size n−1
of the DIFs, we have:
A = A0 ∈ OWA0 ⊆ OWA1 ⊆ OWA2 ⊆
... ⊆ OWAn−1.
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And it is the same with the set of OWC.
Let, there is a subject Sj need to create a
DIF between An−1 and An. So, the subject
Sj needs to read from An−1 then writing to
An, so we have two following steps:
• The first step is reading from An−1 by
the subject and the consequence is:
SWGj = SWGj ∪OWAn−1
And
SWDj = SWDj ∪ SWCn−1.
So A ∈ SWGj and B ∈ OWCA ⊆
SWDj.
• The second step is writing to An, with
the condition, that SWGj∩OWCn = ∅.
However, in our case, we have A ∈
SWGj and A ∈ OWCn, so the inter-
section is different from the empty set
(∅).
So, the writing query is denied because
A0 ∈ OWCn. And the result is that
no CIF between those competing com-
panies A and B. QED
We conclude, that our distributed D-
CWSPM assures that no CIF between any
two companies if they are in conflict of in-
terest.
5. D-CWSPM VS
ACCESS MATRIX
In this section, we will present how to imple-
ment our distributed model using the matrix
as mechanism, and to compare it with the
previous proposed models.
5.1 Access matrix Model
Firstly, in our model, any object’s wall is
represented by the pairwise (OWA,OWC).
And The set of walls can be viewed as a bi-
nary relation between objects, therefore can
be represented by a matrix, where we call it,
the object’s wall matrix (OWM).
The OWM , be a matrix with element
OWM(i, j) corresponding to the members
of OB×OB, where the value of OWM(i, j)
is:
1: The object obji contains (or stored inside
itself ) a data related to objj;
0: The object obji cannot contain any data
related to the object objj. Or the object
obji has a data related to an object in
the conflict of interest with the object
objj.
-1: There isn’t any data related to the ob-
ject objj or to its competing objects,
stored inside the object obji;
Initially,
• OWM(i, j) = 1 if i = j,
• OWM(i, j) = 0 if (obji, objj) ∈ CIR,
• otherwise −1.
And we can define also two subsets of OB:
• OWA(obji) = {objj ∈
OB|OWM(i, j) = 1} the set of all
objects, have their data stored inside of
the object obji,
• OWC(obji) = {objj ∈
OB|OWM(i, j) = 0} the set of all
objects denied to be stored inside of
the object Oi,
The second wall in our model is the sub-
ject’s wall. So for any subject Si, its
wall can be represented by, the pairwise
(SWGi, SWDi). So the set of the walls can
be represented by a binary relation between
subject and object, and can be represented
by a matrix, where we call it, the Subject’s
wall matrix (SWM).
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The SWM : is an access matrix with
elements SWM(i, j) corresponding to the
members of the SU × OB, where the value
of SWM(i, j) is:
1: The subject Si contains a data related
to the object objj.
0: The subject Si cannot contain any re-
lated information of the object objj
-1: There isn’t any data related to the ob-
ject objj or their competing objects, in-
side of the subject Si;
Initially, SWM(i, j) = −1 for all (i, j).
And From this matrix, we can also define
two subsets of:
• SWG(Si) = {Oj ∈ OB|SWM(i, j) =
1} the set of the objects, have a data
inside of the subject wall of Si,
• SWD(Si) = {Oj ∈ OB|SWM(i, j) =
0} the set of the objects denied to the
subject Si,
In the end, and after the representation of
the objects’ wall and the subjects’ wall by
using the matrix (OWM, SWM ) as mecha-
nism, we will show, how updating them, for
every access query.
Let the Query(Si, objj,mode), any query
made by a subject Si to access to the object
objj with the mode equal to read or write.
The access is authorized, if and only if; this
condition is verified:
SWGi ∩OWCj = ∅ And
SWDi ∩OWAj = ∅
And in the same time:
If the mode is Reading Query (In Subject
side): So the updating of the subject’s wall
as following:
• SWM(i, h) = 1 where objh ∈ OWAj,
(as SWGi = SWGi ∪OWAj)
• SWM(i, h) = 0 where objh ∈ OWCj,
(as SWDi = SWDi ∪OWCj)
If the mode is Writing Query (In Object
side): So the updating of the object’s wall
as following:
• OWM(j, h) = 1 where objh ∈ SWGi,
(as OWAj = SWGi ∪OWAj)
• OWM(j, h) = 0 where objh ∈ SWDi,
(as OWCj = SWDi ∪OWCj)
Otherwise, the access is denied, and in the
same times:
• SWM [i, j] = 0
5.2 Information flows,
Objects, Companies and
their Allies
In our model, we focused our work, on the re-
lations between objects and the information
flows between them. However, what about
of the flow between the objects in the same
company?
The answer is the information flows is
freely between them. So, we build the object
wall around the allied objects (allied compa-
nies).
However, in our proposed model the up-
date of the matrix OWM is focused on the
object, and not on the companies. So, to fix
this problem, the solution is the mapping of
OWM from of OB×OB to Comp×Comp.
By this mapping, we will assure that, we
can’t find the data of two competing com-
panies stored inside the same company (in
different objects of the same company).
6. RELATED WORKS
In this section we will present a set of related
works, where in the first section we present
the previous proposed models based an ac-
cess matrix, and theirs problems. Then,
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in the next section we will present the re-
lated application works of the CWSP in the
environment as distributed system (Cloud-
Computing, work-flow).
6.1 Related works based on
access matrix
The CWSPM was identified and so named
by Brewer and Nash (BN’s model), where
they developed a mathematical model for
this policy (Brewer & Nash, 1989). Their
idea is the grouped of the dataset of com-
panies in conflict of interest classes (COI ),
so a set of partitions and applying to sub-
jects a mandatory ruling, where all subjects
are allowed access to at most one dataset be-
longing to each such conflict of interest class
(security rule ). Where, the access is only
granted if the object requested:
a) Is in the same Company Dataset as an
object already accessed by that subject,
or,
b) Belongs to an entirely different Conflict
of Interest Class.
Access, means read or write. So, this
to answer that no direct information flow
(DIF ) between competing companies. And
also they prevents the CIF by the application
of the start-property rule to write access,
where is only permitted if, the:
a) Access is permitted by the simple
security rule, and,
b) No object can be read which is in a dif-
ferent Company Dataset to the one for
which write access is requested and con-
tains un-sanitized information.
The proposal was a great idea. Unfor-
tunately, BN’s model was based on incor-
rect assumption that corporate data can
be partitioned (decomposed) into mutually
disjoint conflict of interest classes (COI-
classes), such a disjoint collection is called
a partition in mathematics. COI-classes sel-
dom disjoint, they do overlap, and hence BN
theory collapses. Also, the authors did not
distinguish between human users and sub-
jects that are processes running on behalf
of users. The BN’s write rule (*-property)
is successful in preventing such information
leakage by Trojan Horse. However, it does
so at an unacceptable cost.
It is easy to see that the BN write rule has
the following implications (Sandhu, 1992):
A subject which has read objects from two
or more company datasets cannot write at
all. And, a subject which has read ob-
jects from exactly one company dataset can
write to that dataset. These implications are
clearly unacceptable (if the computer sys-
tem is to be used for something more than
a read-only repository of confidential infor-
mation)(Sandhu, 1992). Under this regime
a consultant can work effectively so long as
he or she is assigned to exactly one company
(however, even then the consultants is for-
bidden to write public information). When
the consultant is assigned to a second com-
pany, he or she will be unable to write any
information into the system. Consequently,
the model proposed is very restrictive as it
allows a consultant to work for one company.
Sandhu (Sandhu, 1992) improves upon
this model by making a clear distinction be-
tween users, principals, and subjects, de-
fines a lattice-based security structure, and
shows how the CWP complies with the Bell-
Lapadula model (Bell & La Padula, 1976).
In the same year, Lin announces a modi-
fied model, called an aggressive Chinese Wall
Security Policy Model (ACWSPM )(Lin,
1989) to fix the errors of BN. The error is
that the conflict of interest (COI ) is a binary
relation (CIR), and not, an equivalence class
(partitions). The CIR is non-reflexive, sym-
metric and Anti-transitive. The Lin’s idea is
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the construction of a partition, so an equiv-
alence relation. Lin, extend the CIR rela-
tion to an equivalence relation (partition).
However, then the known properties of a bi-
nary relation do not support the elegance
and crispness of an equivalence relation, the
enthusiasm was lost.
Based on the work of Pawlak (Pawlak,
1984) (Pawlak, 1997), Lin in (Lin, 2002),
show that the lack of crispness of the
ACWSP, since CIR cannot produce a par-
tition. However, the partition, can be re-
captured by the induced equivalence relation
of a binary relation. The idea is ”each binary
relation induced equivalence relation” (Lin,
2002)-(Lin, 2007). The induced equivalence
relation named by IAR ”In allied with” re-
lation used by Lin is the complement of CIR
(Theorem: CIR is a symmetric and anti-
reflexive and anti-transitive binary relation.
Its complement IAR is an equivalence rela-
tion).
In the end Lin applied a rules to subjects
based on CIR relation and an allied parti-
tion, all this to answer that no information
flow can will occur between the competing
companies.
From these previous models, we are ob-
serving, that both models BN and Lin, based
on the partitioning of the companies in set of
class (partitions). In BN’s model the com-
peting companies in the same partition, how-
ever, in Lin’s model the allied companies in
the same partition. The partitions in BN’s
model can overlap (example A in conflict
with B, B with C and C with D). In Lin’s
model the partition based on the comple-
ment of the CIR relation (induced equiva-
lence relation), can overlap if the CIR rela-
tion is not ”ant-transitive”, case named by
Lin as a ”Bad CIR Relation” (page 10 in
(Lin, 2003)), so a real case excluded by Lin’s
model!
Also, we are observing, that, Lin in
(Lin, 1989)-(Lin, 2007) fix the problems
of the DIF / CIF by the using of the
same BN’s idea (Brewer & Nash, 1989), un-
sanitized/sanitized information and also the
read/write access type, where: In BN the un-
sanitized information is confined to its self-
company but in Lin to allied dataset. So,
the inheriting of the problem (Sandhu, 1992)
”consultant to work for one company only”
to ”consultant to work for one allied com-
panies only”. So, no difference between the
problem of the DIF and the CIF inside the
same company / allied companies (as a set
of objects in the same of a single company).
There is a recent and interested work pro-
posed by Sharifi and al. (Sharifi & Tripuni-
tara, 2013), where they proposed a Least-
Restrictive Enforcement of the CWSPM
based on graph representation.Their enforce-
ment mechanism mediates read attempts
only to prevent subject-violations, and write
attempts only to prevent object-violations.
However, there is a strong mathematical
confusion between the notion of the class,
partition, equivalence binary relation and
the transitivity property (page 3 ). Also,
their graph representation is very complex
for the implementation.
Finally, our new model in this article is
easy for the implementation based access
matrix and fixing the problems of the pre-
vious proposed models.
In the first, our main objective is the ap-
plication of the CWSP in the Cloud Com-
puting, and the social network and not the
proposition of a new model for the CWSP.
However, and after analyses of the pre-
vious proposed models (Brewer & Nash,
1989)-(Sandhu, 1992), and theirs applica-
tions (Atluri et al., 2004) (Hsiao & Hwang,
2010) (Wu et al., 2010) (Tsai et al., 2011)
(Kesarwani et al., 2011) (Xie et al., 2013)
(Alqahtani, Gamble, & Ray, 2013) (Minsky,
2004), we are surprising by many problems.
For example the problem of the Conflict of
interest (COI) is a set of disjoint class or a
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binary relation (CIR), the error was fixed in
1989 by Lin (Lin, 1989)-(Lin, 2007), but to
our days there are many applications based
on COI classes and not a CIR binary rela-
tion.
6.2 Related application works
in environment as
distributed system:
In the past, there are many attempt to ap-
plying the CWSPM in environment as dis-
tributed system.
Firstly in the Cloud-Computing (as a dis-
tributed system), The CWSP used in (Tsai
et al., 2011), is to fix inter-VM attack from
competitors, which targets at the VMs run-
ning on the same physical machine, so each
two competing VMs cannot hosted in the
same physical machines so that physical iso-
lation. The authors use the conflict of inter-
est and the graph colouring algorithm for the
VM deployment. However, the authors were
based on centralized control mechanism.
Also, in (Wu et al., 2010) use the CWSPM
for the ”Information Flow Control in Cloud
Computing”, at the IaaS level.Based on the
concept of the conflict of interest is parti-
tion (BN’s model), however, it is a binary
relation (Lin, 1989), and so they based on
wrong model, and the same problem with
two other work (Kesarwani et al., 2011)-(Xie
et al., 2013) in Cloud Computing.
In the end, there is an interesting work
(Minsky, 2004), named by ”A Decentralized
Treatment of a Highly Distributed Chinese-
Wall”, however, they based on wrong model,
the Brewer and Nash model (Brewer & Nash,
1989).
7. IMPLEMENTATION
D-CWSPM BASED ON
OBJECT ORIENTED
PROGRAMMING
To valid our approach, we developed a pro-
totype, based on Object Oriented Program-
ming (OOP), and using the C++ as pro-
gramming language. In this model’s imple-
mentation, we defined, four following classes:
• System Class: This class is the main
class of the implementation, where each
instance from this class, contains in its
private section, the companies’ identifi-
cation, the CIR Relation definition and
the subjects’ identification in the sys-
tem. The instance, is responsible for
the creation/destruction of the compa-
nies and the updating of the CIR Rela-
tion.
• Company Class: This class is the set
of all companies, where each company’s
instance contains the following propri-
eties: The identification list of all its ob-
jects and the company’s wall, the pair-
wise (CWA,CWC). The company in-
stance responsible for the creation / de-
struction of their objects.
• Object Class: This class is the set of all
objects in our system, where each in-
stance is related to a single company,
and has its ”object wall”, the pairwise
(OWA,OWC). The class has also a set
of interface for the communication with
the other object in the system.
• Subject Class: This class is the set of
all subject in our system, where each in-
stance has an single identification, and
can access to any object in our sys-
tem, by using the object interfaces, and
CWSP rule.
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8. CONCLUSION
The Chinese wall security policy model
(CWSPM ) is very interesting solution, to
control the information flow between com-
peting companies in cloud computing (multi-
tenancy) or social network (as a real com-
peting platform) in general. The CWSPM’s
idea is the building of the wall between the
dataset of the competing companies by ap-
plying of a mandatory rules to the subjects
(people are only allowed access to informa-
tion which is not held to conflict with any
other information that they already possess
(Brewer & Nash, 1989)).
So, the CWSPM can be used as mecha-
nism to control the information flow, and
in the same time as an access control im-
posed to the subjects. However, the previ-
ous proposed model have a many problems
(Brewer & Nash, 1989)-(Lin, 2007), (Sharifi
& Tripunitara, 2013), with application of
these model in different way, with the same
problems, and based on a matrix as mecha-
nism without distribution.
In this work, we proposed a new model
for this policy, where we named it a Dis-
tributed Chinese Wall Security policy Model
(D-CWSPM ). Our model is real interpreta-
tion of the CWSP, (we can’t find inside the
same wall a data related to competing com-
panies). The D-CWSPM’s idea is the build-
ing of the wall around the subject (Brewer
& Nash, 1989), as the same to the objects.
The model fix the problem of the ”a mali-
cious Trojan horses”, based on the concept
of ”the information can flow between two ob-
jects only via a subject and information can
flow between two subjects only via an object
(Sharifi & Tripunitara, 2013)”.
Our model is based on a mathematical
model, where the Conflict of interest is a
binary relation and not a set of partitions
(Class) (Lin, 1989)-(Lin, 2007). And, by
the interpretation gave of two kinds of the
queries (Reading / Writing). Our model as-
sures that we cannot find any information
flow between two competing companies, Di-
rect or Composite information flow. So the
fixing of the malicious Trojan horses prob-
lem.
Our model is easy to implementing it, in
any way, basing on an access matrix between
subjects/objects (can be compared with the
previous proposed models) or in real dis-
tributed system (as Cloud Computing).
We have validate our model, by an im-
plementation prototype, based on the tech-
nique of, Object Oriented Programming.
Where, the entire security labels are dis-
tributed among the system’s elements (ob-
ject and subject). Which, any element had
its security label (its Wall). This, proto-
type, can will be applied it, in the Cloud-
Computing (Software as a service SaaS ) or
in the social network as real competing en-
vironment.
In the future works,
1. Initially, our main objective was the ap-
plication of the CWSPM in the Cloud-
Computing and not the proposition of
a new model. So, our next step is the
application of this model in the Cloud-
Computing at the service level ”Infras-
tructure As a Service (IaaS )”, to control
the information between Virtual ma-
chines (multi-tenancy). Then the appli-
cation of the model at the service level
”Software As a service (SaaS )”, by the
developing of prototypes, based on the
technique of Object Oriented Program-
ming.
2. Introduction of this security model in
the conception and development process
of the solutions’ kind as SaaS. So, the
PaaS level (Platform as a Service).
3. We believe to applying our model in any
previous application of the Chinese wall
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in the past based on the wrong models.
4. The model can be used in Inter-process
communication (IPC ), so not always
and only between subject and object.
So to extending it between processes
(subjects) as active entity in the same
system.
5. In the end, the implementation of our
model by using the capabilities as an
access control in real distributed sys-
tem, and to control the information flow
between competition groups in the so-
cial network.
9. APPENDICES,
PREVIOUS MODELS
In this section we will present the two main
proposed model of CWSP, the BN’s and
Lin’s model
9.1 BN’s Model:
9.1.1 Database organisation
In the BN’s model, all corporate information
is stored in a hierarchically arranged filing
system such as that shown in Figure1.
• At the lowest level, we consider indi-
vidual items of information, each con-
cerning 3 single corporation. In keep-
ing with BLP, we will refer to the files
in which such information is stored as
objects; There are three levels of signif-
icance:
• At the intermediate level, we group all
objects which concern the same corpo-
ration together into what we will call a
company data set;
• At the highest level, we group together
all company datasets whose corpora-
tions are in competition. We will refer
to each such group as a conflict of inter-
est class.
Figure 1. The composition of the objects
(Brewer & Nash, 1989)
9.1.2 Basic Model
Let S be a set of subjects, O be a set of
objects and L a set of security labels (x, y).
One such label is associated with each ob-
ject. We introduce functions X(o) and Y (o)
which determine respectively the x and y
components of this security label for a given
object O. We will refer to the x as con-
flict of interest classes, the y as company
datasets and introduce the notation xj, yj to
mean X(Oj) and Y (Oj) respectively. Thus
for some object Oj, Xj is its conflict of in-
terest class and yj is its company dataset.
• Axiom l:
y1 = y2 → x1 = x2
In other words, if any two objects 01 and
02 belong to the same company dataset
then they also belong to the same con-
flict of interest class.
• Corollary l:
x1 <> x2 → y1 <> y2
In other words, if any two objects 01 and
02 belong to different conflict of interest
classes then they must belong to differ-
ent company datasets.
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• Definition l:
N , a boolean matrix with elements
N(v, c) corresponding to the members
of S×C which take the value true if sub-
ject sv has, or has had, access to object
Oc or the value false if Sv has not had
access to object O0 Once some request
R(u, r) by subject Su to access some
new object Or has been granted then
N(u, r) must be set true to reflect the
fact that access has now been granted.
Thus, without loss of generality, any re-
quest R(u, r) causes a state transition
whereby N is replaced by some new N ,
N ′.
• Axiom 2:
Access to any object Or by any sub-
ject su is granted if and only if for all
N(u, c) = true (i.e. by D1, su has had
access to Oo)
((Xo <> Xr)or(yc = yr)).
• Axiom 3:
N(v, c) =false, for all (v, c) represents
an initially secure state.
• Axiom 4:
If N(u, c) is everywhere false for some
su then any request R(u, r) is granted.
• Theorem 1:
Once a subject has accessed an object
the only other objects accessible by that
subject lie within the same company
dataset or within a different conflict of
interest class.
• Theorem 2:
A subject can at most have access to
one company dataset in each conflict of
interest class.
• Theorem 3:
If for some conflict of interest class X
there are Xv company datasets then the
minimum number of subjects which will
allow every object to be accessed by at
least one subject is Xv.
9.1.3 Sanitized Information
• Definition 2:
For any object Oa,
Ya = Yo implies that Oa contains sani-
tized information
Ya <> Yo implies that Oa contains un-
sanitized information
• Axiom 5:
Yo ⇐⇒ Xo
In other words, if an object bears the
security label Yo then it must also bear
the label Xo and vice versa. theorem 2
tells us that all subjects can access this
company dataset.
• Axiom 6:
Write access to any object Ob by any
subject Su is permitted if and only if
N ′(u, b) = true and there does not exist
any object Oa (N
′(u, a) = true) which
can be read by Su for which:
Ya <> Yb and Ya <> Yo.
• Theorem 4:
The flow of un-sanitized information is
confined to its o,wn company dataset;
sanitized information may however flow
freely throughout the system.
9.2 Lin’s Model:
In this section and before to present the Lin’s
model we start by some by presenting some
properties related to the binary relations,
then the Lin’s model.
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9.2.1 Binary Relation Property
Let V a set of objects (or elements), and we
recall some definitions:
• A binary relation is a subset, B ⊆ V ×V
for each object p ∈ V , we associate a set
Bp defined by:
Bp = {v ∈ V |pBv} or Bp = {v ∈
V |(p, v) ∈ B}.
That consists of all elements v that are
related to p by B. Bp is called a binary
neighbourhood.
If the binary relation is an equivalence
relation, then Bp is the equivalence class
containing p.
• A symmetric binary relation B is a bi-
nary relation such that for every (u, v) ∈
B implies (v, u) ∈ B.
• A binary relation B is anti-reflexive: if
B is non-empty and no pair (v, v) is in
B. That is, B ∩ ∆ = ∅, where ∆ =
{(v, v)|v ∈ V } is called diagonal set.
• A binary relation B is anti-transitive: if
B is non-empty and if (u, v) belongs to
B implies that for all w either (u,w) or
(w, v) belongs to B.
Let the complement, B′ = V × V ∼
B, is called the complement binary relation
(CBR) of B.
Proposition: if B is symmetric, anti-
reflexive and anti-transitive, then B′ is an
equivalence relation (Lin, 2007).
Corollary 4: If B is symmetric, anti-
reflexive and anti-transitive, then B′ is the
induced equivalence relation EB.
9.2.2 Model
In spite of their error, Brewer and Nash’s
intuitive idea is a fascinating one. To keep
their spirit, in (Lin, 1989) Lin reformulated
the model based on a general binary relation;
however, the expected sharpness and crisp-
ness of the model, which are reflections some
characteristics of equivalence relations, are
lost. With the notion of the induced equiva-
lence relation, in this section, we will present
the mains points of Lin’s model based on in-
duced equivalence.
Let O be a set of objects; an object is a
dataset of a company. In Lin’s model the
conflict of interest is a binary relation, noted
by CIR. Where CIR ⊆ O×O, satisfies the
following properties:
CIR-1: CIR is symmetric.
CIR-2: CIR is anti-reflexive.
CIR-3: CIR is anti-transitive.
It should be clear CIR-2 is necessary; a
company cannot conflict to itself. If com-
pany A is in conflicts with B, B is certainly
in conflicts with A, so CIR-1 is valid.
To see CIR-3, let O = {USA,UK,USSR}
be a set of three countries. Let CIR be ”in
cold war with”. If the relation ”in cold war
with” were transitive, then the following two
statements:
(1) USA is in cold war with USSR.
(2) USSR is in cold war with UK.
would imply that
(3) USA is in cold war with UK.
Obviously, this is absurd. In fact this ar-
gument is applicable to any country; In other
words, (2) and (3) cannot be both true for
any country (that replaces UK ). So we have
anti-transitivity for CIR.
Let ECIR be the induced equivalence rela-
tion of CIR. In this model a new ”axiom”
will be explicitly added, though it is implied
by the others (See Proposition 2 )
CIR-4: The granulation of CIR and parti-
tion of ECIR are compatible, in the sense
that each CIR-neighbourhood is a union
of ECIR-equivalence classes.
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In (Lin, 1989), So, the placed the Chi-
nese walls on the boundary of a CIR-
neighbourhood, this ”new axiom” implies
that that such a boundary is actually on
some boundary of some unions of ECIR-
equivalence classes.
CIR-5: If we interpret CIR as ”in cold war
with” - relation, then the complement is
”in ally with”-relation (IAR). IAR is an
equivalence relation, by Corollary 4.
Here are the same views of theorems in
(Brewer & Nash, 1989) and (Lin, 1989).
• Theorem 1:
Once a agent Si has accessed an object
Oj, the only other objects Ok accessible
by Si is either inside the allied dataset
of Oj or outside of CIROj .
• Theorem 2:
The minimum number of agents which
allow every object to be accessed by at
least one agent is n, where n is the num-
ber of ECIR-equivalence classes.
• Theorem 3:
The flow of un-sanitized information is
confined to its allied dataset; sanitized
information may, however, flow freely
through the system.
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